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Abstract
Research Question Did gang members and gangs named by police in four separate
court-ordered 24-month injunctions, issued at different times, reduce the frequency and
harm of crimes they committed, and suffer fewer crimes against themselves as well?
Data The study examined criminal histories of 36 members of four gangs for a 36-
month period before and a 36-month period after their respective injunctions. Data also
included records of crimes committed against the gang members in the same time
periods. Criminal activity was measured by arrests, station interviews, fixed penalty
notices and summonses. Days offenders spent in custody, which rose during the gang
injunction periods, were removed from denominators calculating rates, so that the
estimates of changes in offender behaviour and victimisations are all based on their
days at liberty and out of prison or jail.
Methods The study compared the magnitude of change in both individual-level and
gang-level measures of crime and victimisation from before to after the issuance of the
injunction as ‘natural quasi-experiments’, with comparisons made to other gangs in
Liverpool which had not been subjects of injunctions.
Findings Across all 36 gang members, their individual offending counts dropped by
70% in the 3 years after their gang injunctions, while the Cambridge Crime Harm Index
weight of the seriousness of their total crimes dropped by 61%. Fewer criminal events
were attributed to 92% of the individuals in the second 3-year period than in the first,
while only 8% increased their detected activity. Taking the four gangs as the unit of
analysis, their offences dropped by 74% in the 3 years after the injunctions, while their
Crime Harm Index weight dropped by 70%. Victimisation of the gang members in their
3-year post-injunction period dropped by 60% compared to the pre-injunction period.
Comparisons between gangs with injunctions and gangs without showed downward
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crime trends in the injunction gangs that were not observed in the comparisons during
the same time periods, but regression to the mean could not be ruled out as an
explanation for the findings.
Conclusions The evidence for the effectiveness of gang injunctions in reducing crime
harm is stronger than the evidence for most police practices. There is no evidence in
this study of these injunctions causing crime to increase. Police agencies may be
encouraged to use such powers when available, as long as they track the trends with
sufficient care to detect any potential backfire effects.
Keywords Gangs . Injunctions . Violent Crime . CrimeHarm Index . Policing . Natural
Quasi-experiments
Introduction
Young men in gangs challenge police forces around the world. While the range of legal
powers to meet that challenge varies widely, few of those powers have ever been
evaluated for their effectiveness. In 2009, the government of England and Wales
introduced a tool aimed at preventing gang violence: the gang injunction. The aim of
this study is to assess the impact of this tool on four organised crime groups in
Merseyside, to the extent possible using observational data. Examining injunctions
against four gangs as ‘natural quasi-experiments’ involving 36 individuals affiliated to
4 Organised Crime Groups in Merseyside between 2009 and 2016, the study shows a
consistent reduction in criminal events, the total severity of harm (as measured by the
Cambridge Crime Harm Index or CHI) and victimisation of the gang members named
in the injunctions.
The Gang Injunction As A Sanction Threat
Gang injunctions are designed to work by creating a ‘Sword of Damocles’ threat of
punishment (Sherman 2011) to hang over the heads of named gang members, upon the
basis of a court order. The Policing and Crime Act 2009 authorises law enforcement
agencies to apply to a County Court for an injunction if they can demonstrate evidence
showing a balance of probability that
& an individual is involved in or has encouraged gang-related violence or drug
dealing activity, and
& a gang injunction is necessary to prevent such activity or protect the individual from
harm.
In the event these conditions are met, the court may grant an injunction for a period
of 2 years that would restrict movement, association with co-offenders, and other
ordinarily legal activities for the named gang members. The stated purpose of these
restrictions is to reduce opportunities for the persons named in the injunction to cause
harm, or to be exposed to harm. Any breach, such as contact with other gang members,
carries a maximum sentence of 2 years of imprisonment (HM Government 2015a, b)—
a Sword of Damocles of the kind that Dunford (1990) demonstrated experimentally had
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reduced injuries to domestic abuse victims by simply issuing warrants for the arrest of
their unapprehended offenders.
The use of gang injunctions also conforms to the concept of ‘Pulling
Levers’, a process described by Braga and Weisburd (2012) as a framework
of focussed deterrence strategies directed towards a particular crime problem,
generally in the form of a multi-agency response, which uses a standing threat
of a variety of sanctions (Pulling Levers) to press offenders to change their
behaviour. A key element of this concept is direct and repeated communication
with offenders to ensure they understand why they are receiving special atten-
tion. This process starts with telling the gang members that they have been
named by a gang injunction, presenting the message that ‘We know who you
are, where you live and what you do. If you keep doing it, we will arrest you
for it’ (Decker 2003: 290).
Gang injunctions are also conceptually related to police crackdowns
(Sherman 1990) as they involve a sudden increase in officer presence, sanctions
and threats of apprehension for either specific offences or for all offences
within a defined geographical area. Enforcement of gang injunctions, however,
should in principle result in little or no inconvenience to the wider community
since these gang crackdowns are directed towards specific individuals to iden-
tify any breach at the earliest opportunity.
Previous Research on Gang Injunctions
While gang injunctions are a new concept to the UK, they appear to have been
used in the USA as early as 1980 (Decker 2003). Nonetheless, there is little
research into the effectiveness of gang injunctions. Decker (2003) cites three
studies into the impact of gang injunctions, with widely differing results:
& An examination of crime data for Inglewood, Los Angeles, demonstrated
negligible reductions in crime post issuance of the injunction (Maxson and
Allen 1997).
& Grogger (2002) examination of 14 Los Angeles County injunctions between
1993 and 1998 demonstrated modest reductions in crime after issuance of
the injunctions.
& Research conducted by the ACLU Foundation for Southern California (1997) into
the effectiveness of the Blythe Street gang injunction found that there were
significant increases in violent crime and drug trafficking after issuance of the
injunction.
Gang Injunctions in Merseyside
The 2009 legislation dictates that, in order to obtain a Gang Injunction, law enforce-
ment agencies must not only demonstrate that an individual has been concerned in drug
dealing activity or violence. Police must also show that the persons named committed
actions that were ‘gang related’. The legal requirements for how law enforcement
agencies must demonstrate the ‘gang related’ character of actions is to show that
Camb J Evid Based Polic
& named persons have acted as part of a group of three or more and
& have shown ‘one or more’ characteristic that allows its members to be identified as
a group.
While this is a difficult concept to prove, the principles of Organised Crime Group
Mapping (OCGM) offer a clear method for the identification of criminal groups and how
they impact on communities. OCGM uses intelligence, arrest or offending histories and
records of criminal convictions to ‘map’ or ‘index’OCGswith regards to their level of intent
and capability to cause harm. According to the manual on OCGM (2010), the ‘map’ or
‘index’ creates a consolidated picture in terms of where organised crime occurs, which
groups are involved, where they operate and where they live.
Merseyside has an estimated population of 1.379 million, housing 190 Organised Crime
Groups (OCGs) with 2883members, all of whom have all been assessed in accordance with
the principles of OCGM. The OCGs represent less than 0.01% of the population, and could
be described as part of a ‘Power Few’ of most serious violent offenders (Sherman 2007).
Three Research Questions
This research is intended to answer three research questions about the changes associated
with the issuance of injunctions against four gangs in Merseyside, a policing area that
includes the City of Liverpool. Each question focuses on the gang members named in four
separate injunctions, issued at different times, in relation to criminal events in which they
were named in police investigations during the 24-month period of the injunction:
1. Did violent crime by gang members decline?
2. Did the total Cambridge Crime Harm Index value of the crime by gang members
decline?
3. Did criminal victimisation of the gang members decline?
Data
Data for this article includes the offending histories of 36 individuals between 2009 and
2016, all of whom were affiliated to four Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) in Mer-
seyside and named in a court order called a gang injunction. These data contain data on
specific offence types that can be coded by the Cambridge Crime Harm Index
(Sherman et al. 2016), a tool to measure severity of harm from criminal events based
on Sentencing Guidelines for each offence type in England and Wales. The CHI is a
weighted index that assigns more weight or significance to more serious crimes than to
less serious crimes.
Methods
Since April 2012, Merseyside Police have named a total of 75 individuals in gang
injunctions against 9 different OCGs situated in different areas across the Merseyside
area. In each case, hierarchical structures have been determined, intelligence assess-
ments made and applications in respect of gang members have been granted by the
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Liverpool County Court. Most of injunctions are relatively recent and do not provide
sufficient longevity to allow feasible assessment against the research questions, and
others did not translate into ‘full’ injunctions because some individuals had been
sentenced to substantial periods of imprisonment post issuance of an ‘interim’ injunc-
tion. The study is therefore limited to injunctions against the four gangs that offered
follow-up periods of 36 months.
At the time this study was undertaken as a master’s thesis in the Cambridge Police
Executive programme, there were 36 individuals affiliated to 4 OCGs who had been subject
to gang injunctions for significant periods. They presented an opportunity to assess whether
the injunction had made a difference in terms of offending volume, associated harm and
victimisation. Having been subject to four separate gang injunctions (in April, July and
October 2012 andMarch 2013 respectively), they presented an opportunity to examine their
longitudinal offending history for 36 months ‘before and after’ the injunction. It is those 36
subjects of four gangs subjected to injunction who comprise the core of the ‘natural quasi-
experiments’ in this study (see Table 1).
It is important to note that gang injunctions are personalised to the individual and while
‘interim’ injunctions may be granted in one hearing, applications with regards to ‘full’
injunctions can be heard and granted at different times. As a consequence, duration of
injunctions may vary across individuals in the data set. This research established that
injunctions subject of this studywere granted for periods ranging between 25 and 36months.
To analyse the cumulative effect of gang injunctions, the first author calculated the average
duration of each injunction in the study as 31 months, thereby allowing greater consistency
with regards to a cumulative analytical assessment across all four gang injunctions.
Measuring Offending
This study measures offending by these 36 offenders on the basis of arrests, rather than
charges or convictions. While this measure is not perfect, it is more inclusive than the
alternatives. The Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act of 2005 requires that the
lawful arrest of an individual be supported by two elements of evidence: (1) a person’s
involvement, suspected involvement or attempted involvement in the commission of a
criminal offence; and (2) reasonable grounds for believing that the person’s arrest is
Table 1 Gang injunction dates of interim orders, with modal dates of full orders and expiry
OCG Number subject to
injunction
Date of interim gang
injunction
Modal date of full gang
injunction
Modal expiry
date
Av e r a g e
duration
OCG
1
6 25/04/2012 27/11/2012 27/05/2014 27 months
OCG
2
11 24/07/2012 14/05/2013 31/03/2015 27 months
OCG
3
14 15/10/2012 08/04/2014 08/10/2015 34 months
OCG
4
5 19/03/2013 19/03/2014 18/03/2016 36 months
Total 36 31 months
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necessary in that regard. These fundamentals were deemed insufficient, however, in 2012 by
a revision of Code G of the Codes of Practice; this was revised to reflect the requirement to
place greater emphasis on the use of a process known as ‘Voluntary Attendance for
Interview’ as a viable alternative to arrest. This revision falls within the period of this
research and therefore ‘Voluntary Attendance’ is considered an equally strong indicator of
offending behaviour as arrest. Finally, English law counts as sanctions police actions called
‘fixed penalty notices’ and ‘reporting of the facts for summons’. These may be less intrusive
options for offender management but are also equal to arrest as indicators of offending
behaviour.
In summary, offending behaviour by the 36 subjects of this study is measured
consistently from before to after the gang injunction by (1) arrests, (2) voluntary
attendance for interviews, (3) fixed penalty notices and (4) summonses. These measures
are derived from enforcement activity, so there is a possibility that there is a bias based on
extra police attention to persons named in the gang injunctions. That bias, however,
would only tend to under-estimate any crime reduction effects, since it would detect more
crime among those named by injunctions than among those in the comparison groups.
Data Sources
In order to gather the necessary information with regards to ‘first-stage’ offending behav-
iour, this study examined records held on a Merseyside Police information technology
system known as Niche RMS (Records Management System), which is a single unified
operational policing system that captures the complete ‘Merseyside Specific’ history of
people, places, vehicles, property and evidence.While this system provided themajority of
data for this study, additional data contained within the Police National Computer (PNC)
and the Police National Database (PND)was examined in order to ensure that the complete
national offending picture is considered for each of the 36 subjects as well.
Niche This system is commonly used across law enforcement agencies in England and
Wales, and while there are a number of functions, this research will focus on data held
in respect of offender management, such as custody records, crime classifications and
modus operandi. Every incident or event relating to crime and offending is recorded on
Niche RMS as an ‘Occurrence’, each of which are identified through a unique ten-digit
reference number to which all aggrieved, offenders, suspects, witnesses, vehicles and
places are linked. It is important to note that Niche relies heavily on human input and as
a consequence is susceptible to human error and in some cases duplication of records.
While over time the potential for duplication has been reduced, fixed and free text fields
containing personal information as well as official crime and offending data were
examined with rigour in order to ensure accuracy and avoidance of ‘double counting’.
Police National Computer The Police National Computer (PNC) is a national data-
base of offence, conviction, bail and confinement records and has been described as the
‘backbone’ of studies that seek to establish whether an individual has been arrested or
convicted in the UK (Sutherland 2013). With the allocation of a unique identification
number known as the PNCID, which is linked to other unique verifiable reference
numbers and undergoes constant accuracy scanning and cleaning at the local and
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national levels, there can be a fairly high degree of certainty placed on the reliability of
data derived from the PNC.
PNC records of the 36 individuals associated with this study have been physically
examined in order to establish a complete list of all four of the ‘first-stage’ offending
indications of offending. Dates of arrest, or in cases of summary convictions and fixed
penalties the date of offence, have been extracted in accordance with the time param-
eters of this study.
Time at Liberty The individual subjects of this study are considered high-frequency,
high-harm offenders, and as such, it is not unusual they spend periods of time in
custody. Records contained within the Police National Computer demonstrate that this
cohort spent on average 6% of their time in custody before the gang injunction and on
average 14% of their time in custody afterwards. This study therefore adjusts offending
rates to allow for time ‘at liberty’ as failure to adjust for time spent in custody may lead
to an under-estimation of reoffending and a corresponding over-estimation in terms of
rate of desistence, by virtue of having over-estimated exposure time to offending
(Ferante et al. 2009). The PNC holds the relevant remand, bail and custody informa-
tion, which allows for a month-by-month assessment of remand and custody and a high
degree of certainty with regards to the identification of time at liberty.
Data Compilation Initial acquisition of all material relevant to this study was undertaken
by a Merseyside Police Analyst, who was experienced in extracting data of this type. All
formatting, examination and analysis of this data was completed by the first author. Further
details on data extraction, categorisation and limitations are available at Carr (2016).
Measurement of Harm The instrument used for measuring severity of harm in the
analysis of these questions is the Cambridge Crime Harm Index (CHI). To achieve
consistency of measurement, the author manually indexed appropriate CHI values to each
of the 636 offending and victimisation records. Harm values have been determined in
accordance with the work of Sherman et al. (2016), which creates a consistent and robust
measurement of crime harm. There are however a number of factors within this study which
make it necessary to introduce an element of subjectivity to the concept of harm. First, a
number of offences contained within the data, such as cruelty to animals and breach of the
peace, do not carry an associated harm score and therefore the author has introduced a CHI
value of 1 to ensure offence records of this nature are included in the overall mean harm
values. Second, offences described in accordance with Home Office Counting Codes 149/
00/01 and 149/00/03 as criminal damage to a dwelling or vehicle with a value under £5000,
which carry a CHI value of 2, do not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence when
the damage had been caused through the discharge of a firearm. Therefore, a more reflective
CHI value of 1825, associated with the possession of a firearm with intent to cause fear of
violence (Home Office Code 008/23), has been applied in these circumstances.
Analytic Procedure
This study seeks to address the research question at both the individual and gang levels:
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1. Whether there is a difference in offending rates, levels of harm and victimisation
associated with individual gang members immediately following the issuance of a
gang injunction
2. Whether there is a difference in offending rates, levels of harm and victimisation
associated with the gang as a whole immediately following the issuance of a gang
injunction
Individual and gang averages in terms of offending and associated harm were
calculated in accordance with time ‘at liberty’.
Findings
Individual Offending Volume
The cleaned dataset contained 485 offending episodes, distributed over 36 individuals.
These events were divided into before and after the date of each subject’s injunction.
Because there was an increase of days spent in custody in the after periods, all findings
are adjusted for subject days ‘at liberty’ and out of custody as the denominator for rates
calculated.
Figure 1 below displays a longitudinal analysis of ‘at liberty’ offending behaviour of
OCGs 1–4 across 36 months before and after the injunction. It demonstrates how in the
period before the injunction, this cohort were each associated with an adjusted average of
0.317 offences per month (OPM) spent at liberty, while in contrast in the period after the
injunctions, the same offenders were involved in an average of 0.095 OPM at liberty,
representing a difference of -70%. Further analysis of individual offending data illustrates
how although 8% of individuals increased their offending rate during the period beyond the
injunction, the remaining 92% demonstrated reduced levels of offending, with some falling
to zero across the examination period.
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Individual ‘At Liberty’ Crime Harm Values
Average harm values were calculated with regards to the longitudinal study, and
similarly ‘adjusted’ averages were calculated in respect of the reduced examination
period.
Figure 2 below illustrates the difference in harm associated with ‘at liberty’
offending for OCGs 1–4 across the longitudinal study. Analysis shows that during
the period before the injunction, this cohort each caused an average of 112.75 units of
CHI harm per month, whereas in the period beyond, they caused an average of 44.14
CHI per month, a difference of -61%.
Group Offending Analysis
Analysis of data thus far has concentrated on overall and individual offending, associ-
ated crime harm and victimisation ‘before and after’ the gang injunction. While these
results tell part of the story, they do not specifically address the question in terms of
whether or not these differences are induced as a consequence of a gang injunction. In
order to add a stronger basis for inferring causation, the analysis also makes a series of
comparisons to other gangs in time periods when they had not been subjected to
injunctions.
‘At Liberty’ Offending and Harm Associated with OCGs 1–4 Across 36 months ‘Before
and After’ the Gang Injunction
Figure 3 below displays the monthly volume of total offences per at-liberty gang
member in OCG1, showing a pattern similar to the other three OCGs (for full
display of figures for each OCG, see Carr 2016). The pattern is similar to that in Fig. 4,
which displays Crime Harm per member at liberty for OCG1. All trends are shown in
Fig. 7.
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Both Figs. 3 and 4 show a similar pattern as the data displayed in Table 2.
Table 2 displays baseline differences, but proportional similarities in post-injunction
changes in offending and associated harm attributed to OCGs 1–4. In four out of four
cases, there are similar reductions in both crime volume and crime harm, with greater
proportional reductions in OCGs 2 and 4 which had the highest baseline offending
volume.
When the four natural quasi-experiments are combined in a pooled analysis
standardised by the date of their respective injunctions, they show the same clear
pattern of decline in volume of offending, with a slight rise after the expiry of the
injunctions (Fig. 5). Figure 6 shows a similar pattern with the pooled analysis of Crime
Harm Index values per members at liberty.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
Av
er
ag
e
O
ﬀe
nd
in
g
Ra
te
pe
rM
on
th
Months Before and Aer
OCG 1 'At Liberty' Oﬀending 36 Months Before and Aer
Gang Injuncon
April 2012
Expiry
Gang Injuncons for
OCG's 2, 3 & 4.
Diﬀerence Before
and Aer -53%
Fig. 3 OCG1 offending volume across 36 months ‘before and after’ the gang injunction. Note: The faint grey
line depicts actual offending, while the dotted line depicts the fitted trend line
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
Av
er
ag
e
Cr
im
e
Ha
rm
Pe
rM
on
th
Months Before and Aer
OCG1 'At Liberty' Crime Harm 36 Months Before and Aer
Gang Injuncon
April 2012
Expiry
Gang Injuncons for
OCG's 2, 3 & 4
Diﬀerence Before
and Aer -68%
Fig. 4 OCG1 at liberty crime harm
Camb J Evid Based Polic
Using Staggered Dates of Injunctions to Create Comparison Groups
In Fig. 7, the offending frequency trends for all four groups are presented in real time to
provide a series of comparisons between OCGs with and without injunctions. The
analysis of OCG1 as the first treatment group, for example, illustrates that after the
injunction there is an obvious decline to the point of expiry, when there is evidence of
decay in deterrence as offending begins to rise. At the same time, OCG2 served as the
first comparison group to the OCG1 trend until OCG2 received its own injunction. In
this contrast, while group 1 was declining after the injunction, group 2 demonstrated an
escalating trend until the issuance of its injunction. This shows that when group 1
started its decline, there was no general (or what methodologists call ‘secular’) decline
in gang crime, at least among these four gangs in Merseyside. Similarly, analysis of
OCG3 as the second comparison group illustrates a marginally static offending pattern
while OCG1 was declining, until the introduction of group 3’s injunction at which point
offending declines in a similar way.
The most pronounced effect is observed with OCG4 as the final comparison group,
in relation to all three groups that received injunctions before OCG4’s. While all other
Table 2 Summary findings of OCGs1–4 for 36 months ‘before and after’ the gang injunction
OCG 1 OCG 2 OCG 3 OCG 4
Offending Harm Offending Harm Offending Harm Offending Harm
Before 0.285OPM 79.53CHI 0.326OPM 165.3CHI 0.213OPM 66.04CHI 0.554OPM 99.65CHI
After 0.129OPM 31.90CHI 0.086OPM 67.68CHI 0.073OPM 12.66CHI 0.072OPM 28.21CHI
Difference − 56% − 60% − 73% − 59% − 66% − 81% − 87% − 72%
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OCGs are subject to treatment with their offending in decline, offending with regards to
OCG4 continues to escalate until the injunction when treatment takes effect and offending
declines in a sharp downward trajectory.
In the same way Fig. 7 illustrates the difference between treatment and comparison
groups for offending volume, Fig. 8 illustrates a similar picture with regards to harm. Again,
analysis of OCG1 as the first treatment group shows associated harm declining beyond the
point of injunction until expiry when decay begins to take effect. When compared against
OCGs2 and 3 as the first control groups, while it is difficult to detect any discernible short-
term difference, beyond the injunction these groups follow a similar pattern as displayed by
OCG 1. Again, themost pronounced difference occurs with OCG4, which while OCGs 1, 2
and 3 are receiving treatment and demonstrating a downward trajectory with regards to
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
Av
er
ag
e
Cr
im
e
Ha
rm
Pe
rM
on
th
Months Before and Aer
OCGs 1 - 4 Combined Harm 36 Months Before and Aer Their
Respecve Injuncons
Gang Injuncon
Average Duraon
31 Months
Diﬀerence Before and
Aer -70%
Fig. 6 OCGs1–4 cumulative crime harm across 36 months ‘before and after’ the gang injunction
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
AV
ER
AG
E 
O
FF
EN
DI
N
G 
PE
R 
M
O
N
TH
MONTHS BEFORE AND AFTER TREATMENT
Oﬀending Volume - 4 Treatments versus 3 Comparisons 
OCG 1 
OCG 2 OCG 3
OCG 4
Expiry 
OCG 1
OCG 2
OCG 3
OCG 4
Fig. 7 ‘Overlay’ of OCGs1–4 with comparison of offending volume against treatment and control
Camb J Evid Based Polic
harm, OCG4 as the final control group, while receiving no treatment, harm continues to
escalate sharply until the point of treatment when it declines almost to the point of zero.
Other Trends
Carr (2016) presents further details regarding enforcement of breaches of gang injunc-
tions, victimisation of the gang members and comparisons across two other OCGS that
received injunctions very recently (and lacked a full 36 months of follow-up observa-
tions). The main points of these further analyses are as follows:
1. Most breaches of the gang injunctions occur in the first year, with few if any
breaches in year 2.
2. Victimisation of gang members (as victims of crime) declined by 60% after the
injunctions, with no victim of serious violence before the injunction sustained a
new serious incident after the injunctions.
Conclusions
The answers to the three research questions, for both gang members and gangs as
groups, are all ‘yes’. Relative to the 36 months before the injunctions were imposed on
each of the four OCGs, violent crime by gang members declined, the Crime Harm
Index value of the crime they committed declined and criminal victimisation of the
gang members declined. Since these patterns are remarkably consistent, they raise the
most important question about the policy implications of these findings: did the gang
injunctions cause these changes from before to after? In other words, were the
reductions in offending and victimisation the impact of the injunctions, did they all
occur by chance or were they all caused by some other factor?
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The answer to the question of causation is always elusive. By using each OCG as the
comparison group for all of the others, we can eliminate the rival hypothesis that the
cause of the reductions was a general decline in gang violence, or crime in general. The
data clearly show that while one OCG shows a drop in crime after its injunction, other
OCGs at exactly the same time are continuing or increasing their crime rates and harms.
That means we have controlled for what impact evaluation methodologists like Donald
T. Campbell call ‘history’ (Cook and Campbell 1979).
What this analysis cannot control for is ‘regression to the mean’, or the natural
tendency in any statistical series for what goes up to come back down. That kind of
‘noise’ is normal fluctuation in any series of events, such as football teams winning or
losing many games in a season. The large rise and fall of crime by OCG4 before it rose
again until a gang injunction was imposed may be just such a pattern of internal growth
and decline in crime. While it seems unlikely that all four separate OCGs would have a
‘change’ regression to the mean at almost exactly the moment that an injunction is issued,
and in very similar magnitudes, it is impossible to rule that out with just four cases.
What may be more important, however, is the lack of any backfiring effect. Unlike
the case cited in the USA (ACLU), none of the Merseyside cases showed any increases
in crime volume or harm, let alone victimisation of the gang members. On this point,
the data are consistent for all four groups with the 36 offenders in the overall data set.
While a small percentage of the offenders named in the injunctions (8%) increased their
offending after the injunction, the vast majority (92%) reduced their offending. On that
basis, the worst that can be said about these findings is that there is a small possibility
that they may reflect no true benefit; there is no evidence of a possible causation of
harm.
These findings therefore serve to offer law enforcement agencies across England and
Wales the opportunity to use Gang Injunctions to tackle gang-related criminality in an
alternative way from traditional crime-by-crime enforcement.
Policy Implications
Successive government policy has witnessed an escalation of civil orders and injunctions
designed to protect communities from harm. The introduction of gang injunctions,
however, saw a shift in emphasis within a legislative framework that not only sought to
protect communities but also to protect the enjoined individuals themselves from harm.
Some groups challenged their introduction as having a disproportionate impact on already
disadvantaged communities (Liberty 2010). The present research goes beyond prior
studies by isolating changes in offending behaviour to the temporal point of intervention
and using treatment versusmultiple control analysis to eliminate some of the other possible
explanatory factors for change. More important, when results were examined with regards
to victimisation of the gangmembers, similar findings were observed. The key component
of this policy designed to protect the individuals from harm may have been successfully
delivered, and certainly no increase in harm to gang members was observed.
Finally, while the scope of research did not include ‘cost-benefit’ analysis, Mersey-
side Police estimate the cost of injunctions for each OCG to be in the region of
£15,000.00. When compared against investigative costs for serious and complex
crimes, they demonstrate excellent value for money.
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In summary, this study provides four tests of the hypothesis that gang injunctions
work. Three of these tests had a comparison group. All four showed a change in the
desired direction on six measures, for 24 out of 24 tests. Compared to the complete
absence of evidence for most innovations in policing, the evidence supporting gang
injunctions would appear to be strong indeed.
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